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PAPER
Secure Regenerating Codes Using Linear Regenerating Codes and
the All-or-Nothing Transform
Hidenori KUWAKADO†a), Senior Member and Masazumi KURIHARA††b), Member
SUMMARY This paper proposes secure regenerating codes that are
composed of non-secure regenerating codes and a new all-or-nothing trans-
form. Unlike the previous analysis of secure regenerating codes, the secu-
rity of the proposed codes is analyzed in the sense of the indistinguisha-
bility. The advantage of the proposed codes is that the overhead caused by
the security against eavesdropping is much less than that of previous secure
regenerating codes. The security of the proposed codes against eavesdrop-
ping mainly depends on the new all-or-nothing transform.
key words: regenerating code, secure regenerating code, all-or-nothing
transform, indistinguishability
1. Introduction
Cloud computing is supported with large-scale distributed
storage systems. Since component failures in storage sys-
tems often happen, data are usually stored in redundant ways
to ensure their availability. Regenerating codes [1] allow us
to encode a message to n shares in such a way that the fol-
lowing properties are satisfied.
Reconstruction: The message can be reconstructed from
any k shares.
Regeneration: Any share can be regenerated from any d
pieces that are computed from shares.
It seems diﬃcult to achieve this property by erasure
encoding such as Reed-Solomon codes. Since the seminal
paper of Dimakis et al. [1], many regenerating codes have
been proposed, but they have imposed various restrictions in
terms of parameters and practicality. Rashmi et al. [2] have
shown the generic construction of regenerating codes, called
a product-matrix framework. There are three types of re-
generating methods: exact repair, functional repair, and hy-
brid repair. The regenerating method of the product-matrix
framework is exact repair. While the product-matrix frame-
work often requires a large finite field, their codes can be
constructed over the binary finite field. Hence, their codes
are useful in practice.
Regenerating codes were originally for improving the
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availability of nodes and are not for achieving the confiden-
tiality. When the network to which nodes are connected
is public, there is a possibility of eavesdropping. Pawar
et al. [3] have studied regenerating codes for achieving the
confidentiality, called secure regenerating codes. Secure re-
generating codes are better than secret sharing schemes on
distributed storage systems because the latter cannot regen-
erate a share without the reconstruction of a message. Re-
generating codes based on the product-matrix framework
can be modified to secure regenerating codes that achieve
the upper bound of secrecy capacity [4]–[7]. Another way to
construct secure regenerating codes is to employ an appro-
priate preprocessing before encoding a message with non-
secure regenerating codes [8]. This code does not achieve
the upper bound of secrecy capacity.
The above secure regenerating codes are information-
theoretically secure against eavesdropping. However, the
amount of stored data with secure regenerating codes is
much less than that with non-secure regenerating codes even
if the upper bound of secrecy capacity is achieved. To solve
this problem, we relax the definition of secure regenerating
codes using the concept of indistinguishability. An adver-
sary (including an eavesdropper) in this paper is assumed
to have unlimited computational power except for making
access to oracles. We next propose a new scheme for con-
structing secure regenerating codes. The proposed scheme
consists of a non-secure linear regenerating code and an all-
or-nothing transform. The amount of stored data with the
proposed secure regenerating code is almost the same as that
with the underlying non-secure regenerating code.
The all-or-nothing transform is one such that if a part
of the output is missing, then no information about the input
is given. Although all-or-nothing transforms were designed
to improve the security against brute-force attacks of a se-
cret key [9], the all-or-nothing transform used in this paper is
newly designed for constructing secure regenerating codes.
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 briefly
summarizes the concept of regenerating codes, the definition
of secure regenerating codes, and the all-or-nothing trans-
form. Section 3 proposes how to construct a secure regen-
erating code from an all-or-nothing transform and a non-
secure regenerating code. Section 3 also shows an example
of the construction that does not yield the secure regenerat-
ing code. Since this is primarily caused by the definition of
an all-or-nothing transform, we need a new definition suit-
able for our purpose. Section 4 relaxes the definition of
an all-or-nothing transform and shows a new all-or-nothing
Copyright c© 2017 The Institute of Electronics, Information and Communication Engineers
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transform satisfying the relaxed definition. Its proof is given
in Sect. 6. Section 5 proposes a new definition of secure re-
generating codes and shows a new secure regenerating code
satisfying the new definition. The comparison of new secure
regenerating codes with previous secure regenerating codes
is described. Section 7 concludes this paper.
2. Preliminaries
This section summarizes notations and definitions on regen-
erating codes, secure regenerating codes, and all-or-nothing
transforms. Furthermore, their examples are given.
2.1 Regenerating Codes
Consider a distributed storage system with n nodes for stor-
ing a message (z1, . . . , zB) ∈ FBp where Fp denotes a finite
field with p elements. Each node stores α symbols called a
share, denoted by
c(i) = (c(i)1 , . . . , c(i)α ) ∈ Fαp (1)
where i denotes a node index. A data collector can recon-
struct the message from any k shares. When a node f fails, a
replacement node connects to any d remaining nodes called
helper nodes, and downloads β symbols called a piece from
each helper node, denoted by
d(i)f = (d(i)f ,1, . . . , d(i)f ,β) ∈ Fβp. (2)
Note that the helper node i can compute d(i)f from c
(i) and the
replacement node can regenerate c( f ) from an ordered set of
d pieces
v
(i1,...,id)
f = (d(i1)f , . . . , d(id)f ), (3)
which is called a piece vector for node f . The size dβ of a
piece vector is called repair bandwidth.
An [n, k, d, α, β, B] regenerating code is a code such
that k and d are minimum values under which the mes-
sage reconstruction and the share regeneration can be al-
ways guaranteed. When parameters α, β, B are not focused,
they are sometimes omitted. That is, it is sometimes called
an [n, k, d] regenerating code. We call the regenerating code
such that
α =
2dB
k(2d − k + 1) , β =
2B
k(2d − k + 1) (4)
a minimum bandwidth regeneration (MBR) code and call the
regenerating code such that
α =
B
k , β =
B
k(d − k + 1) (5)
a minimum storage regeneration (MSR) code.
After several constructions of MBR/MSR codes
for limited parameters were studied, Rashmi et al. [2]
have shown the product-matrix framework to construct
MBR/MSR codes for wide range parameters. We call their
codes PM-MBR/MSR codes. The more general construction
of PM-MSR codes has been shown by Lin and Chung [10].
2.2 Special Class of the MBR Code
A repair-by-transfer (RBT) MBR code is the MBR code such
that the regeneration is accomplished only with transfer of
pieces [11]. For this remarkable feature, a piece vector for
failed node f is equal to a share of failed node f . That is,
v
(i1,...,id)
f = c
( f ), (6)
which is equivalent to
(d(i1)f ,1 , . . . , d(i1)f ,β , . . . , d(id)f ,1 , . . . , d(id)f ,β ) = (c( f )1 , . . . , c( f )α )
because of Eqs. (1)–(3). From the equation above, we see
dβ = α, which is the condition of MBR codes (Eq. (4)).
For example, an [n, k, n−1, n−1, 1, B] RBT-MBR code
is constructed in the following manner. A message is de-
noted by (z1, . . . , zB) ∈ FBp . Encode B message symbols us-
ing an [
(
n
2
)
, B]-MDS code† where
(
n
2
)
and B denote a code-
word length and the number of information symbols, respec-
tively. Let {ci|i = 1, . . . ,
(
n
2
)
} be code symbols. Assign each
code symbol to nodes in such a way that each code symbol
is stored in two nodes. Accordingly, each node has n − 1
code symbols that are a share of the node. When a node
fails, each helper node just transmits the code symbol that
was shared with the failed node.
We show a [4, 2, 3, 3, 1, 5] RBT-MBR code for
(z1, . . . , z5) ∈ F5p, which will be reused in Sect. 3. Using a
single parity check code of length 6, we encode the message
(z1, . . . , z5) to a codeword (c1, . . . , c5, c6) as
ci =
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
zi i = 1, . . . , 5
z1 + z2 + · · · + z5 over Fp i = 6. (7)
This single parity check code is the [6, 5]-MDS code. Then,
node i stores a share c(i) that consists of three code symbols
as follows:
c(1) = (c1, c2, c3), c(2) = (c1, c4, c5),
c(3) = (c2, c5, c6), c(4) = (c3, c4, c6).
We see that the message can be reconstructed from any two
shares and any share can be regenerated by three nodes. For
example, if node 4 fails, then a replacement node can re-
generate share c(4) by receiving c3, c4, c6 from nodes 1, 2, 3,
respectively. That is, the piece vector v(1,2,3)4 and pieces d
(1)
4 ,
d(2)4 , d
(3)
4 are given as
v
(1,2,3)
4 = (d(1)4 , d(2)4 , d(3)4 ) (8)
d(1)4 = (d(1)4,1) = (c3)
d(2)4 = (d(2)4,1) = (c4)
d(3)4 = (d(3)4,1) = (c6).
†Maximum distance separable code.
KUWAKADO and KURIHARA: SECURE REGENERATING CODES
485
We can confirm that Eq. (6) holds, that is, v(1,2,3)4 = c(4).
Since β = 1, the piece is indeed a scalar value rather than
a vector.
2.3 Linear Regenerating Codes
PM-MBR/MSR codes and RBT-MBR codes belong to a
class of linear regenerating codes, which is defined as a set
of regenerating codes satisfying the following two condi-
tions.
1. Linear reconstruction: Code symbols stored in each
node are linear combinations of the B message sym-
bols over Fp.
2. Linear regeneration: Symbols in the piece of a helper
node are linear combinations of α symbols of its share
over Fp.
We here focus on the linear reconstruction because the
linear regeneration is of little relevance to later discussion.
We can rephrase the linear reconstruction (the first condi-
tion) as follows: There exists a matrix Me that is indepen-
dent of a message (z1, . . . , zB) ∈ FBp such that
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
c
(1)
1
...
c
(1)
α
...
c
(n)
1
...
c
(n)
α
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
=Me
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
z1
...
zB
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠ over Fp,
where (c(i)1 , . . . , c(i)α ) denotes a share c(i) of node i. In this
paper, we interchangeably use a row vector and a column
vector. Since the interchange is very obvious, it does not
create any confusion. For example, Me of the [4, 2, 3, 3, 1, 5]
RBT-MBR code described in Sect. 2.2 is given as
Me =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
1 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0
1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 1
0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1
1 1 1 1 1
0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 1 0
1 1 1 1 1
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
.
Similarly, we can rephrase the reconstruction as fol-
lows: There exists a way for solving the following system
of equations in terms of a message (z1, . . . , zB).
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
c
(i1)
1
...
c
(i1)
α
...
c
(ik)
1
...
c
(ik)
α
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
=M(i1,...,ik)rc
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
z1
...
zB
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠ over Fp (9)
where M(i1,...,ik)rc denotes a matrix that consists of rows of Me
corresponding to c(i1), . . . , c(ik). Since M(i1,...,ik)rc is usually a
non-square matrix, Me is artfully designed to find the mes-
sage. For example, consider the RBT-MBR code described
in Sect. 2.2. When the data collector has access to node 1
and node 4, M(1,4)rc is given by
M(1,4)rc =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
1 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0
0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 1 0
1 1 1 1 1
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
.
Although the matrix above is not non-singular, it is easy to
see that the message (z1, . . . , z5) can be uniquely determined
for a given (c(1)1 , c(1)2 , c(1)3 , c(4)1 , c(4)2 , c(4)3 ).
Let v be an integer less than k (i.e., v < k). From the
definition of regenerating codes, there is no way for deter-
mining (z1, . . . , zB) uniquely to satisfy the following system
of equations.
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
c
(i1)
1
...
c
(i1)
α
...
c
(iv)
1
...
c
(iv)
α
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
=M(i1,...,iv)rc
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
z1
...
zB
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠ over Fp
where M(i1,...,iv)rc is a matrix that consists of rows of Me cor-
responding to c(i1), . . . , c(iv). For example, consider the RBT-
MBR code described in Sect. 2.2. When a data collector
only has access to node 3, M(3)rc is given by
M(3)rc =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1
1 1 1 1 1
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠ . (10)
Although message symbols z2, z5 can be found, the others
z1, z3, z4 cannot be determined uniquely, that is, the data
collector only knows the value of z1 + z3 + z4. Thus, when
one share is missing, one message symbol is not always lost
and a linearly-combined value of lost message symbols may
be given.
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2.4 Secure Regenerating Codes
Definition 1 ([4]). Let  be an integer less than k and let
τ and μ denote non-negative integers such that  = τ + μ.
Suppose that an eavesdropper gains access to shares in τ
nodes, and the data downloaded during repair (i.e., piece
vectors) in other μ nodes. An {, μ} secure distributed stor-
age system is one in which such an eavesdropper obtains no
information about the message.
We call an [n, k, d] regenerating code for achieving the {, μ}
secure distributed storage system an [n, k, d, α, β, Bs, , μ] se-
cure regenerating code. The case of  = μ was studied by
Pawar et al. [3] before Definition 1 was proposed.
Secure regenerating codes based on PM-MBR/MSR
codes, called PM-SR codes, have been proposed in arti-
cles [4]–[7]. The idea of PM-SR codes is to replace R mes-
sage symbols in B message symbols of an [n, k, d, α, β, B]
PM-MBR/MSR code with R random symbols. The follow-
ing examples of PM-SR codes will be used for a comparison
with the proposed schemes in Sect. 5.2.1 and Sect. 5.2.2.
(1) PM-SR Code Using a PM-MBR Code
Given an [n, k, d, d, 1, k(2d−k+1)/2] PM-MBR code, replac-
ing (k − 1)(2d − k + 2)/2 appropriate message symbols with
random symbols yields an [n, k, d, d, 1, d−k+1, k−1, μ] PM-
SR code where μ ≤ k − 1 [5]. For example, replacing 15 ap-
propriate message symbols of the [n, 4, 6, 6, 1, 18] PM-MBR
code with 15 random symbols yields the [n, 4, 6, 6, 1, 3, 3, μ]
PM-SR code where μ ≤ 3.
(2) PM-SR Code Using a PM-MSR Code
Given an [n, k, 2(k − 1), k − 1, 1, k(k − 1)] PM-MSR code,
replacing 2(k − 1) appropriate message symbols with ran-
dom symbols yields an [n, k, 2(k − 1), k − 1, 1, (k − 1)(k −
2), , μ] PM-SR code where  + μ ≤ 2 [7]. For ex-
ample, replacing 8 appropriate message symbols of the
[n, 5, 8, 4, 1, 20] PM-MSR code with 8 random symbols
yields the [n, 5, 8, 4, 1, 12, , μ] PM-SR code where +μ ≤ 2.
Both of the PM-SR codes achieve the upper bound of
the secrecy capacity defined by Pawar et al. [3] That is, we
cannot make the number of message symbols larger as long
as we obey Definition 1. The objective of this paper is to
increase the number of message symbols.
2.5 All-or-Nothing Transform
An all-or-nothing transform Π is defined as a pair of two
algorithms (E,D) satisfying the following conditions [9].
1. E is a probabilistic algorithm that takes a message
(m1, . . . ,mB) ∈ {0, 1}lB to produce a pseudo-message
(z1, . . . , zB′) ∈ {0, 1}lB′ where l is a bit length of a sym-
bol zi. Note that l and  are diﬀerent symbols.
2. D is a deterministic algorithm that takes a pseudo-
message (z1, . . . , zB′) to produce the corresponding
message (m1, . . . ,mB) or a special symbol ⊥ where ⊥
indicates that the pseudo-message is invalid.
3. It is infeasible to compute any function of any message
symbol mi if any one of the pseudo-message symbols
zi is unknown.
The all-or-nothing transform Π does not require any secret
information. That is, everyone can compute the pseudo-
message from a message and also can obtain the message (or
⊥) from a pseudo-message. In this sense, the all-or-nothing
transform is not an encryption.
Since the last condition is informal, Desai [12] has for-
mally defined the infeasibility using an experiment. The ex-
periment consists of a find stage and a guess stage. During
the find stage, it comes up with a message and some auxil-
iary information. A challenge is either its pseudo-message
or a random string. In the guess stage, an adversary is al-
lowed to obtain all but one of the challenge symbols and it
guesses whether the challenge is the pseudo-message or the
random string.
Before introducing Desai’s definition, we describe no-
tations. For a probabilistic algorithm H, h← H denotes that
the output of H is assigned to h. For a set S , s  S denotes
that an element is chosen from S according to the uniform
distribution on S and the element is assigned to s.
Definition 2 ([12]). Let Π = (E,D). For a probabilistic
algorithm (an adversary) A and b ∈ {0, 1}, define an experi-
ment ExpaonΠ (A, b) as follows.
1. find stage: ((m1, . . . ,mB), s) ← A where s is auxiliary
information. A can transmit information such as hints
with s to a guess stage.
2. If b = 0, then (z1, . . . , zB′) ← E((m1, . . . ,mB)). Other-
wise (z1, . . . , zB′ )  {0, 1}lB′ .
3. guess stage: bA ← AO(s) where
• O denotes an oracle that takes B′ − 1 indexes j ∈
{1, . . . , B′} returns z j’s.
• s denotes the auxiliary information produced in
the find stage.
Unlike the find stage, the adversary A of this stage only
outputs 0 or 1.
4. The value of ExpaonΠ (A, b) is bA.
The advantage of A is defined as
AdvaonΠ (A)
=
∣∣∣∣Pr [ExpaonΠ (A, 1) = 1
]
− Pr
[
ExpaonΠ (A, 0) = 1
]∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣2Pr [ExpaonΠ (A, b) = b
]
− 1
∣∣∣∣,
and the advantage of Π is defined as
AdvaonΠ (q) = maxA Adv
aon
Π (A), (11)
where q is the number of queries to underlying oracles that
are used by E and D if they exist. If AdvaonΠ (q) is not larger
than some criterion, then Π is an all-or-nothing transform
in the sense of this definition.
KUWAKADO and KURIHARA: SECURE REGENERATING CODES
487
Fig. 1 Desai’s all-or-nothing transform (B = 4).
Desai [12] has proposed the all-or-nothing transform
ΠD in the sense of Definition 2. The algorithm E of ΠD
is as follows (Fig. 1): Let E be an ideal cipher, that is, a ci-
pher that is uniformly chosen from a set of all blockciphers
{0, 1}l × {0, 1}l→{0, 1}l at random. Let κ  {0, 1}l. For a
given message (m1, . . . ,mB) ∈ {0, 1}lB, compute zi as
zi =
{
mi ⊕ E(κ, i) if i = 1, . . . , B
κ ⊕ z1 ⊕ z2 ⊕ . . . ⊕ zB if i = B + 1, (12)
where ⊕ denotes the bitwise XOR operator and i denotes
the l-bit binary string for representing i. We use the same
symbol for representing a value itself and for representing its
binary string with appropriate length. The pseudo-message
is given by (z1, . . . , zB+1). The algorithmD ofΠD is omitted.
Remark: The discussion in this paper is based on the ideal-
cipher model. A computational model such as a pseudo-
random permutation is generally preferable to the ideal-
cipher model. Although the idealization may not be an accu-
rate reflection of reality, we can at least derive some measure
of the security from a proof within the ideal-cipher model.
3. Counter Example
Consider the following scheme (Fig. 2). First, compute the
pseudo-message from a message using an all-or-nothing
transform. Next, produce shares from the pseudo-message
using an [n, k, d] regenerating code. Then, owing to the re-
construction property of the regenerating code, if k shares
are not collected, then the pseudo-message cannot be recon-
structed completely. Since a part of the pseudo-message is
missing, no information about the message is given owing
to the property of the all-or-nothing transform. Accordingly,
one may think that combining any all-or-nothing transform
and any regenerating code yields a secure regenerating code.
However, the conjecture above is incorrect. A counter
example is shown below. Consider the following scheme
ΩNG (Fig. 3). Suppose that p = 2l. Let (m1, . . . ,m4) ∈ F42l
be a message. We equate the bitwise XOR operation over
{0, 1}l with the addition over F2l . Let E be the encryption of
an ideal cipher from {0, 1}l × {0, 1}l to {0, 1}l. The pseudo-
message (z1, . . . , z5) is produced with Desai’s all-or-nothing
transform ΠD. That is, according to Eq. (12),
zi =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
mi + E(κ, i) over F2l if i = 1, . . . , 4
κ +
4∑
i=1
zi over F2l if i = 5,
(13)
Fig. 2 The composite scheme.
Fig. 3 The composite scheme ΩNG.
where κ  {0, 1}l and we equate the addition over F2l
with the bitwise XOR operation over {0, 1}l. After that,
the pseudo-message is encoded by using the [4, 2, 3, 3, 1, 5]
RBT-MBR code described in Sect. 2.2. That is, for i =
1, . . . , 4, the share c(i) of node i is given by
c(1) = (c1, c2, c3), c(2) = (c1, c4, c5),
c(3) = (c2, c5, c6), c(4) = (c3, c4, c6),
where ci is the code symbol of the single parity code such as
ci =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
zi if i = 1, . . . , 5
5∑
i=1
zi over F2l if i = 6.
(14)
The above scheme ΩNG is the [4, 2, 3, 3, 1, 4] MBR
code, but is not a secure regenerating code for the follow-
ing attack. Suppose that an adversary only knows node 3’s
share c(3). Since c6 in c(3) turns out to be
c6 =
5∑
i=1
zi over F2l (∵ Eq. (14))
=
4∑
i=1
zi +
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
4∑
i=1
zi + κ
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠ over F2l (∵ Eq. (13))
= κ,
the adversary can obtain the second message symbol m2 by
m2 = E(c6, 2) + c2 over F2l (∵ Eq. (13)).
Hence, the scheme ΩNG is not a secure regenerating code.
4. New All-or-Nothing Transform
4.1 New Definition
Definition 2 is insuﬃcient for discussing the composite
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scheme such as Fig. 2 because it assumes only the case that
one pseudo-message symbol is lost. That is, Definition 2
cannot address the situation mentioned in the last paragraph
of Sect. 2.3.
To solve this problem, we relax Definition 2. The re-
laxed definition diﬀers in the followings.
• An adversary is given symbols to which pseudo-
message symbols are linearly transformed. The linear
transform is specified by the adversary, but it is not in-
vertible.
• The relaxed definition is concerned with the indistin-
guishability of a pseudo-message from another pseudo-
message, whereas Definition 2 is concerned with the
indistinguishability of a pseudo-message from a ran-
dom string. According to the relaxed definition, a
pseudo-message may not look like a random string.
Definition 3. Let Π = (E,D). For a probabilistic algo-
rithm (an adversary) A and b ∈ {0, 1}, define an experiment
Expaon2Π (A, b) as follows.
1. find stage: ((m1, . . . ,mB), (mˆ1, . . . , mˆB), s) ← A where
s is auxiliary information.
2. If b = 0, then (z1, . . . , zB′) ← E((m1, . . . ,mB)). Other-
wise (z1, . . . , zB′)← E((mˆ1, . . . , mˆB)).
3. guess stage: bA ← AO(s) where oracle O takes a (B′ −
1) × B′ matrix U such as
U =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
u1,1 u1,2 . . . u1,B′
u2,1 u2,2 . . . u2,B′
...
uB′−2,1 uB′−2,2 . . . uB′−2,B′
uB′−1,1 uB′−1,2 . . . uB′−1,B′
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
.
Notice that U is not a square matrix and B′ − 1 rows
in U are not always linearly independent. Oracle O
returns v1, . . . , vB′−1 given by
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
v1
v2
...
vB′−2
vB′−1
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
= U
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
z1
z2
...
zB′−2
zB′−1
zB′
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
over Fp. (15)
4. The value of Expaon2Π (A, b) is bA.
The advantage of A is defined as
Advaon2Π (A)
=
∣∣∣∣Pr [Expaon2Π (A, 1) = 1
]
− Pr
[
Expaon2Π (A, 0) = 1
]∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣2Pr [Expaon2Π (A, b) = b
]
− 1
∣∣∣∣, (16)
and the advantage of Π is defined as
Advaon2Π (q) = maxA Adv
aon2
Π (A), (17)
where q is the number of queries to underlying oracles that
are used by E andD if they exist. If Advaon2Π (q) is not larger
than some criterion, then Π is an all-or-nothing transform
in the sense of this definition.
Definition 3 can capture a wide variety of how to lose
pseudo-message symbols. For example, when an adversary
chooses U as
U =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
1 0 . . . 0 0
1 1 . . . 0 0
...
0 0 . . . 0 0
0 0 . . . 1 0
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
,
only zB′ is unknown and others z1, . . . zB′−1 are known to the
adversary. This situation is similar to that of Definition 2.
4.2 Gap between Definitions
There exists a non-trivial gap between Definition 2 and Def-
inition 3. Desai’s all-or-nothing transform ΠD has been
proved to be an all-or-nothing transform in the sense of Def-
inition 2. However, we here show that ΠD is not an all-or-
nothing transform in the sense of Definition 3. That is, ΠD
is an example for showing the non-trivial gap between Def-
inition 2 and Definition 3.
Consider ΠD for B = 4. According to experiment
Expaon2ΠD (A, b), we describe an algorithm of an adversary A.
1. A chooses two messages (m1,m2,m3,m4),
(mˆ1, mˆ2, mˆ3, mˆ4) such that m2  mˆ2. Auxiliary infor-
mation s is unnecessary.
2. This step is not performed by A. The oracle O com-
putes (z1, . . . , z5) according to the value of b.
3. A makes the following query to oracle O.
U =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1
1 1 1 1 1
0 0 0 0 0
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠ (18)
Then, O computes
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
v1
v2
v3
v4
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠ = U
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
z1
z2
z3
z4
z5
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
over F2l
=
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
z2
z5
z1 + z2 + z3 + z4 + z5
0
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠ over F2l . (19)
After A receives v1, v2, v3, v4 from O, A finds κ as
v3 =
5∑
i=1
zi over F2l
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=
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
4∑
i=1
zi
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠ + z5 over F2l
=
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
4∑
i=1
zi
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠ +
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝κ +
4∑
i=1
zi
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠ over F2l (∵ Eq. (13))
= κ.
A knows v1 = z2 because of Eq. (19). If
v1 = m2 + E(κ, 2) over F2l (20)
holds, then A assigns 0 to bA. If
v1 = mˆ2 + E(κ, 2) over F2l (21)
holds, then A assigns 1 to bA. Since m2  mˆ2 and
Eq. (13), Eq. (20) or Eq. (21) not both holds.
4. The value of Expaon2ΠD (A, b) is bA.
We evaluate the advantage of A. If b = 0
in the step 2, then Eq. (20) always holds, resulting in
Pr
[
Expaon2ΠD (A, 0) = 1
]
= 0. If b = 1 in the step 2, then
Eq. (21) always holds, resulting in Pr
[
Expaon2ΠD (A, 1) = 1
]
=
1. Hence, the advantage of A is given by
Advaon2Π (A)
=
∣∣∣∣Pr [Expaon2ΠD (A, 1) = 1
]
− Pr
[
Expaon2ΠD (A, 0) = 1
]∣∣∣∣
= 1.
Thus, the adversary can always guess the value of b cor-
rectly. In fact, the algorithm above is equivalent to that of
Sect. 3. The matrix U of Eq. (18) is essentially the same as
the matrix M(3)rc of Eq. (10).
4.3 New Algorithm
We here describe a new all-or-nothing transform Πnew =
(E,D). Suppose that E is the encryption of an ideal ci-
pher {0, 1}ζ × {0, 1}l→{0, 1}l where ζ ≥ l + log2(2B). The
algorithm of E is as follows (Fig. 4): Let (m1, . . . ,mB) be a
message where mi ∈ {0, 1}l. Choose a pseudo-key κ from
{0, 1}l uniformly at random. For i = 1, . . . , B, compute a
pseudo-message symbol zi as
zi = E(κ ‖ i,mi), (22)
where ‖ denotes the concatenation operator of strings. Next,
Fig. 4 The proposed all-or-nothing transform (B = 3).
for i = 1, . . . , B, compute wi as
wi = E(zi ‖ (B + i), e), (23)
where e is a public constant value (say, all zero bits). Com-
pute the last pseudo-message symbol zB+1 as
zB+1 = κ ⊕ w1 ⊕ . . . ⊕ wB (24)
= κ +
B∑
i=1
wi over F2l .
Finally, output z = (z1, . . . , zB+1) as a pseudo-message. The
algorithm ofD is omitted.
Lemma 1 implies that Πnew is the all-or-nothing trans-
form in each of new definitions if the number of queries to
the ideal cipher is much less than 2l. Their proofs are given
in Sect. 6.
Lemma 1. The advantage of Πnew in the sense of Defini-
tion 3 is given by
Advaon2Πnew (q) ≤
2(2B + 3)q
2l − q , (25)
where q is the number of queries to the ideal cipher.
5. New Secure Regenerating Codes
5.1 New Definition of Secure Regenerating Codes
Definition 1 is the information-theoretical definition of se-
cure regenerating codes. We relax the definition of secure
regenerating codes in a manner similar to Definition 3.
Definition 4. Let Ω = (P,C,R) be an [n, k, d, α, β, B] re-
generating code where P, R, and C denote an encoding, a
reconstructing, and a regenerating algorithm, respectively.
An experiment for an adversary A, denoted by ExpsrΩ(A, b),
is defined as follows.
1. find stage: ((m1, . . . ,mB), (mˆ1, . . . , mˆB), s) ← A where
message symbols mi are elements in Fp and s denotes
auxiliary information. IfΩ uses oracles Op, then A can
make queries to oracles.
2. If b = 0, then C ← P((m1, . . . ,mB)), otherwise C ←
P((mˆ1, . . . , mˆB)).
3. guess stage: bA ← AO(s) where oracle O accepts
queries about τ shares c(i1), . . . , c(iτ) and μ piece vec-
tors
v
(i f1 ,1,...,i f1 ,d)
f1 , . . . , v
(i fμ,1,...,i fμ,d)
fμ
and returns it. If Ω uses oracles Op, then A can make
queries to oracles.
4. The value of ExpsrΩ(A, b) is bA.
The advantage of A is defined as
AdvsrΩ(A)
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=
∣∣∣∣Pr [ExpsrΩ(A, 1) = 1
]
− Pr
[
ExpsrΩ(A, 0) = 1
]∣∣∣∣,
and the advantage of Ω is defined as
AdvsrΩ(q) = maxA Adv
sr
Ω(A)
where q is the number of queries to oracle Op. If
AdvsrΩ(q) is not larger than some criterion, then Ω is an
[n, k, d, α, β, B, , μ] secure regenerating code.
The find stage is a stage for the adversary to investigate
Ω in advance. Examples of auxiliary information s include
the message m and information about tricks embedded in
m. The guess stage is a stage for the adversary to guess the
value of b from incomplete shares, piece vectors, and the
auxiliary information. When no oracle Op exists and the ad-
versary has unbounded computational power, Definition 1 is
interpreted as the case of AdvsrΩ(0) = 0 (i.e., perfect indistin-
guishability).
5.2 New Construction of Secure Regenerating Codes
Let us consider a composite scheme described in Sect. 3
again (Fig. 2). Unlike the composite scheme ΩNG in Sect. 3,
a new composite scheme Ωnew uses the all-or-nothing trans-
form Πnew proposed in the Sect. 4.3. The algorithm of Ωnew
is as follows: Given a message (m1, . . . ,mB) ∈ {0, 1}lB where
mi ∈ {0, 1}l, compute a pseudo-message (z1, . . . , zB+1) ∈
{0, 1}l(B+1) using E of Πnew. Consider the pseudo-message
as a vector over F2l , that is, (z1, . . . , zB+1) ∈ FB+12l . For the
pseudo-message, produce a share c(i) = (c(i)1 , . . . , c(i)α ) ∈ Fα2l
of node i using any [n, k, d, α, β, B + 1] linear regenerating
code G over F2l . The reconstruction and the regeneration
are omitted.
The advantage of Ωnew is that the overhead caused by
the security is only one symbol regardless of B. Hence, the
overhead is negligible as B is suﬃciently large. The over-
head of previous secure regenerating codes is plural random
symbols as mentioned in Sect. 2.4. Even if B is suﬃciently
large, the overhead cannot be negligible.
The eﬃciency of Ωnew depends on the all-or-nothing
transform Πnew and the linear regenerating code. The time
for Πnew is roughly two times as long as the time for stan-
dard blockcipher modes (i.e., CBC mode). However, since
pseudo-message blocks except for the last one can be com-
puted independently, the time for Πnew can be reduced with
a parallel processing.
This composite scheme Ωnew is trivially an [n, k, d, α,
β, B] regenerating code. We will show that Ωnew is a secure
regenerating code in the sense of Definition 4.
5.2.1 MBR Codes
Suppose that G is the [n, k, d, α, β, B + 1] linear MBR code.
According to experiment ExpsrΩnew (A, b), we evaluate the ad-
vantage of Ωnew.
1. An adversary A chooses (m1, . . . ,mB) and (mˆ1, . . . , mˆB).
Auxiliary information s is generated if necessary.
2. This step is not performed by A.
3. Since dβ = α from Eq. (4), the adversary does not ob-
tain any extra information from a piece vector. Hence,
we can assume that τ = k − 1 and μ = 0. A makes
queries as c(i1), . . . , c(ik−1) to O. A outputs bA that is de-
termined with A’s attacking algorithm.
4. The value of ExpsrΩnew (A, b) is bA.
Since A knows only k − 1 shares, A cannot obtain the en-
tire pseudo-message. That is, A does not know at least one
pseudo-message symbol or only knows linearly-combined
values on unknown pseudo-message symbols. If there ex-
ists an adversary B such that
AdvsrΩnew (B) > Advaon2Πnew (q), (26)
then it contradicts Eq. (17) because the output of Ωnew is ob-
tained by transforming the output of Πnew linearly. Hence,
AdvsrΩnew (q) ≤ Advaon2Πnew (q) ≤
2(2B + 3)q
2l − q . (27)
The discussion above is summarized below.
Theorem 1. When the underlying regenerating code is an
[n, k, d, α, β, B + 1] linear MBR code, the composite scheme
Ωnew is an [n, k, d, α, β, B, k − 1, μ] secure regenerating code
where 0 ≤ μ ≤ k − 1. The advantage of Ωnew is given by
AdvsrΩnew (q) ≤
2(2B + 3)q
2l − q . (28)
Numerical example: Let us consider conditions for satisfy-
ing
2(2B + 3)q
2l − q ≤ 2
−80 (29)
to achieve AdvsrΩnew (q) ≤ 2−80. Let l = 128, which is a typical
size supported by well-known blockciphers. Substituting it
into Eq. (29) gives
q(4B + 6 + 2−80) ≤ 248. (30)
Since B ≥ 1, 6 + 2−80 is not larger than 12B. The left-hand
side of Eq. (30) can be bounded as follows:
q(4B + 6 + 2−80) ≤ q(4B + 12B) (31)
Hence, qB ≤ 244 is a suﬃcient condition to achieve
AdvsrΩnew (q) ≤ 2−80 for l = 128. For instance, suppose that
the bit length of a message is 1 [MiB]† (i.e., lB = 223). When
B = 216, q is not larger than 228. Thus, when the security
level is fixed, there are a trade-oﬀ between the message size
and the number of queries to encryption/decryption oracles.
Equation (28) is independent of regenerating-code pa-
rameters. This fact is caused by the construction that the en-
coding of a regenerating code is performed after an all-or-
nothing transform. Since the indistinguishability has been
†MiB means the unit symbol for the mebibyte. The binary pre-
fix mebi means 220.
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achieved by the all-or-nothing transform, the subsequent re-
generating code has no eﬀect on the indistinguishability.
Suppose that G is the [n, k, d, d, 1, k(2d− k+ 1)/2] PM-
MBR code that was used in Sect. 2.4. Note that PM-MBR
codes are a subset of linear MBR codes. From Theorem 1,
the composite scheme Ωnew is an [n, k, d, d, 1, k(2d − k +
1)/2 − 1, k − 1, μ] secure regenerating code. As mentioned
in Sect. 2.4, when G is used as the underlying regenerating
code, the [n, k, d, d, 1, d− k+ 1, k− 1, μ] PM-SR code can be
constructed. Although it is diﬃcult to give a fair compari-
son of them because of diﬀerence of security definitions, the
composite scheme Ωnew is more eﬃcient than the PM-SR
code in terms of the number of message symbols because
the following inequality holds for 2 ≤ k ≤ d.
k(2d − k + 1)
2
− 1 ≥ d − k + 1 (32)
For example, let G be the [n, 4, 6, 6, 1, 18] PM-MBR code
that was used in Sect. 2.4. Using G, we obtain
• the [n, 4, 6, 6, 1, 17, 3, μ] secure regenerating code
Ωnew, or
• the [n, 4, 6, 6, 1, 3, 3, μ] PM-SR code.
Thus, Ωnew is 17/3 times better than the PM-SR code with
respect to the size of a message. Note that the security of
Ωnew is based on the ideal-cipher model whereas the security
the PM-SR code is information theoretic.
5.2.2 Linear Regenerating Codes
This section discusses the case of linear regenerating codes
that includes MBR codes discussed in the previous section.
Let G be the [n, k, d, α, β, B + 1] linear regenerating code.
Suppose that an adversary knows τ shares c(i j) of nodes
i1, . . . , iτ and μ piece vectors for nodes f1, . . . , fμ. Owing
to the linear reconstruction and the linear regeneration (see
Sect. 2.3), the adversary obtains the following system of
equations with respect to a pseudo-message (z1, . . . , zB+1).⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
c(i1)
...
c(iτ)
d(i f1 ,1,...,i f1 ,d)f1
...
d(i fμ,1,...,i fμ,d)fμ
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
=Ma
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
z1
...
zB+1
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠ over F2l (33)
where Ma is a matrix over F2l that depends on compromised
shares and piece vectors. Since the length of the vector c(i1)
is α and that of the vector d(i f1 ,1,...,i f1 ,d)f1 is dβ, the size of Ma
is (τα + μdβ) × (B + 1). The matrix Ma is known to the
adversary because the adversary knows the reconstructing
algorithm and the regenerating algorithm of G.
Suppose that τα + μdβ ≤ B. Since our objective is
to evaluate the advantage of an adversary, we have only to
consider that τα + μdβ = B and B rows of Ma are linear in-
dependent. Hence, Eq. (33) is the same structure as Eq. (15)
by considering Ma as U.
Theorem 2. Suppose that G is an [n, k, d, α, β, B + 1] lin-
ear regenerating code. The composite scheme Ωnew is an
[n, k, d, α, β, B, , μ] secure regenerating code where 0 ≤ μ ≤
 if
( − μ)α + μdβ ≤ B. (34)
The advantage of Ωnew is given by
AdvsrΩnew (q) ≤
2(2B + 3)q
2l − q .
First, suppose that G is an [n, k, d, α, β, B + 1] linear
MBR code. Since α = dβ because of Eq. (4), Eq. (34) results
in
( − μ)dβ + μdβ ≤ B.
Substituting Eq. (4) into it yields
2d(B + 1)
k(2d − k + 1) ≤ B
because G is an [n, k, d, α, β, B+1] linear regenerating code.
This inequality can be transformed into
 ≤ k · B
B + 1
(
1 − k − 1
2d
)
. (35)
When the inequality above holds, the composite scheme
Ωnew is the secure regenerating code. On the other hand,
the condition in Theorem 1 is
 ≤ k − 1. (36)
Comparing Eq. (35) with Eq. (36), we observe that The-
orem 1 is of wider application than Theorem 2 because
Eq. (36) does not depend on B, d.
Numerical example: Let us consider the same numerical ex-
ample as Theorem 1. In addition to l = 128, B = 216 and
q ≤ 228, suppose that k = 10 and d = 11. Compare Theo-
rem 2 with Theorem 1 in terms of the acceptable number of
compromised nodes (i.e., ) to achieve the security of 2−80.
In the case of Theorem 2,  has to satisfy
 ≤ 10 · 2
16
216 + 1
(
1 − 9
22
)
≈ 5.90.
On the other hand, in the case of Theorem 1,  has to satisfy
that  ≤ 9.
Next, suppose that G is an [n, k, d, α, β, B + 1] linear
MSR code. From Eq. (5), Eq. (34) is written as
( − μ)(B + 1)
k +
μd(B + 1)
k(d − k + 1) ≤ B,
namely,
 − μ
k +
μd
k(d − k + 1) ≤
B
B + 1
. (37)
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Suppose that G is the [n, k, 2(k − 1), k − 1, 1, k(k − 1)]
PM-MSR code that was used in Sect. 2.4. Substituting pa-
rameters into Eq. (37) gives
 + μ ≤ k − 1k − 1 . (38)
When the inequality above satisfies, the composite scheme
Ωnew is an [n, k, 2(k − 1), k − 1, 1, k(k − 1) − 1, , μ] secure
regenerating code. As mentioned in Sect. 2.4, given G, the
[n, k, 2(k − 1), k − 1, 1, (k − 1)(k − 2), , μ] PM-SR code can
be constructed if
 + μ ≤ 2. (39)
Although it is diﬃcult to give a fair comparison of them
because of diﬀerence of security definitions, Ωnew seems to
be better than the PM-SR code for two reasons.
1. The number of message symbols is larger. The number
of message symbols of Ωnew is k(k − 1) − 1, and that
of the PM-SR code is (k − 1)(k − 2). For k ≥ 2, the
following inequality holds.
k(k − 1) − 1 ≥ (k − 1)(k − 2).
2. The condition on , μ is relaxed. Comparing Eq. (38)
with Eq. (39), we see that
k − 1k − 1 ≥ 2
for k ≥ 3.
For example, let G be the [n, 5, 8, 4, 1, 20] PM-MSR code
that was used in Sect. 2.4. Using G, we obtain
• the [n, 5, 8, 4, 1, 19, , μ] secure regenerating code Ωnew
for  + μ ≤ 19/4, or
• the [n, 5, 8, 4, 1, 12, , μ] PM-SR code for  + μ ≤ 2.
The upper bound of the secrecy capacity of secure
MSR codes and the number of secret message symbols
of a PM-SR code using a PM-MSR code have been re-
cently shown in articles [13], [14], respectively. These codes
achieve information-theoretical security. Since the num-
ber of message symbols of the proposed composite scheme
equals that of an underlying MSR code minus one, the pro-
posed composite scheme is more eﬃcient than these codes
in terms of the number of message symbols.
6. Proof of Lemma 1
6.1 Overview
When two messages to be distinguished are given by an ad-
versary, we notice the following two facts
• If the adversary does not make any queries with all keys
κ ‖ i, then pseudo-message symbols z1, . . . , zB are ran-
dom strings because of the ideal-cipher model.
• If the adversary does not make queries with a some key
zi′ ‖ (B + i′), then the symbol wi′ is a random string
because of the ideal-cipher model. It follows that zB+1
is a random string from the viewpoint of the adversary.
If the adversary does not make such queries, then the advan-
tage of the adversary is precisely 0, that is,
Pr
[
Expaon2Π (A, b) = b
]
=
1
2
.
Hence, we primarily evaluate probabilities of the following
events:
• the adversary makes some query with κ ‖ ∗ where ‘∗’
denotes any integer,
• the adversary makes some query with zi′ ‖ (B + i′)
where zi′ is unknown to the adversary.
6.2 Proof
Let D be the decryption of the ideal cipher and let Qry(χ) de-
note the event that A makes a query such that a key is χ (i.e.,
E(χ, ·) or D(χ, ·)). Let qf and qg be the number of queries to
the ideal cipher in the find stage and that in the guess stage,
respectively. We assume that A does not make a query such
that the answer is determined by previous queries.
Let Badf be the event in the find stage such that
Badf = (Qry(κ ‖ 1) ∨ · · · ∨ Qry(κ ‖ B))
∨ (Qry(z1 ‖ (B + 1)) ∨ · · · ∨ Qry(zB ‖ (B + B))).
This case is that one pseudo-message symbol zι is unknown
and B pseudo-message symbols are known to A. Let Badg
be the event in the guess stage such that
Badg = (Qry(κ ‖ 1) ∨ · · · ∨ Qry(κ ‖ B))
∨ Qry(zι ‖ (B + ι))
where zι is a missing symbol in the guess stage. Let Badfg
be an event as
Badfg = Badf ∨ Badg
and let Suc denote the event of Expaon2Πnew (A, b) = b for abbre-
viation.
Denoting by E the complementary event of an event E,
we have
Pr
[
Expaon2Πnew (A, b) = b
]
= Pr [Suc] (40)
= Pr
[
Suc|Badfg
]
Pr
[
Badfg
]
+ Pr
[
Suc|Badfg
]
Pr
[
Badfg
]
≤ Pr
[
Suc|Badfg
]
+ Pr
[
Badfg
]
(41)
≤ Pr
[
Suc|Badfg
]
+ Pr [Badf] + Pr
[
Badg
]
(42)
≤ Pr
[
Suc|Badfg
]
+ Pr [Badf]
+ Pr
[
Badg|Badf
]
Pr [Badf] + Pr
[
Badg|Badf
]
Pr
[
Badf
]
≤ Pr
[
Suc|Badfg
]
+ 2Pr [Badf] + Pr
[
Badg|Badf
]
. (43)
KUWAKADO and KURIHARA: SECURE REGENERATING CODES
493
Inequalities (41)–(43) are because
Eq. (41): Pr
[
Badfg
]
≤ 1, Pr
[
Suc|Badfg
]
≤ 1,
Eq. (42): Pr
[
Badfg
]
= Pr
[
Badf ∨ Badg
]
≤ Pr [Badf] + Pr
[
Badg
]
,
Eq. (43): Pr
[
Badg|Badf
]
≤ 1, Pr
[
Badf
]
≤ 1.
We evaluate three terms in Eq. (43) in sequence.
(1) First term: Pr
[
Suc|Badfg
]
Suppose that b = 0. In the ideal cipher model, the encryp-
tion (or the decryption) is an independent random permuta-
tion for a diﬀerent key and the answer of the first query is
uniformly chosen from {0, 1}l at random. Hence, each zi (i =
1, . . . , B) is uniformly and independently chosen from {0, 1}l
at random. That is, it is identical to (z1, . . . , zB)  {0, 1}lB,
which is the operation when b = 1. We have
Pr
[
Suc|Badfg
]
=
1
2
. (44)
(2) Second term: Pr [Badf]
All the queries in the find stage are made before κ and zi are
determined. It follows that the best strategy for maximizing
Pr [Badf] is to make qf queries with distinct keys. Let Bad jf
be the event that the key of the j-th query is κ ‖ i or zi ‖ (B+i)
where 1 ≤ ∀i ≤ B. We have
Pr [Badf]
≤ Pr
[
Bad1f
]
+
qf∑
j=2
Pr
[
Bad jf |Bad j−1f
]
≤ B + 1
2l
+
qf∑
j=2
B + 1
2l − ( j − 1)
≤ (B + 1)qf
2l − qf . (45)
Note that Pr
[
Bad1f
]
≤ (B+ 1)/2l because a part of the key is
the known number i ∈ {1, . . . , 2B}.
(3) Last term: Pr
[
Badg|Badf
]
Let Last be the event that the missing symbol zι is zB+1. The
last term is bounded by
Pr
[
Badg|Badf
]
= Pr
[
Badg|Badf ∧ Last
]
Pr [Last]
+ Pr
[
Badg|Badf ∧ Last
]
Pr
[
Last
]
≤ Pr
[
Badg|Badf ∧ Last
]
+ Pr
[
Badg|Badf ∧ Last
]
(46)
First, suppose that Last occurs. Then, the adversary cannot
obtain any information about the pseudo-key κ. Let Bad jg
be the event that the key of the j-th query is κ ‖ i where
1 ≤ ∀i ≤ B. Then,
Pr
[
Badg|Badf ∧ Last
]
≤ Pr
[
Bad1g|Badf ∧ Last
]
+
qg∑
j=2
Pr
[
Bad jg|Bad j−1g ∧ Last
]
≤ 1
2l − qf +
qg∑
j=2
1
2l − (qf + j − 1)
≤ qg
2l − (qf + qg) . (47)
Next, suppose that Last does not occur. Let Bad jg be the
event that the key of the j-th query is κ ‖ i where 1 ≤ ∀i ≤ B
or zι ‖ (B + ι). Then,
Pr
[
Badg|Badf ∧ Last
]
≤ Pr
[
Bad1g|Badf ∧ Last
]
+
qg∑
j=2
Pr
[
Bad jg|Bad j−1g ∧ Last
]
≤ 2
2l − qf +
qg∑
j=2
2
2l − (qf + j − 1)
≤ 2qg
2l − (qf + qg) . (48)
Substituting Eq. (47) and Eq. (48) into Eq. (46) gives
Pr
[
Badg|Badf
]
≤ qg
2l − (qf + qg) +
2qg
2l − (qf + qg)
=
3qg
2l − (qf + qg) . (49)
Substituting Eq. (44), Eq. (45), and Eq. (49) into Eq. (43)
yields
Pr [Suc] ≤ 1
2
+
2(B + 1)qf
2l − qf +
3qg
2l − (qf + qg)
≤ 1
2
+
2(B + 1)qf + 3qg
2l − (qf + qg) (∵ qg ≥ 0)
≤ 1
2
+
2Bqf + 3(qf + qg)
2l − (qf + qg) (∵ qf ≥ 0)
≤ 1
2
+
(2B + 3)(qf + qg)
2l − (qf + qg) (∵ qg ≥ 0).
Letting q = qf + qg, we have
Pr [Suc] ≤ 1
2
+
(2B + 3)q
2l − q . (50)
Substituting the inequality above into Eq. (16) gives
Advaon2Πnew (A) =
∣∣∣∣2Pr [Expaon2Πnew (A, b) = b
]
− 1
∣∣∣∣
= |2Pr [Suc] − 1| (∵ Eq. (40))
≤ 2(2B + 3)q
2l − q . (∵ Eq. (50))
Since the analysis above does not depend on the algorithm
of the adversary A, we obtain the following inequation from
Eq. (16).
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Advaon2Πnew (q) = maxA Adv
aon2
Πnew
(A)
≤ 2(2B + 3)q
2l − q .
7. Concluding Remarks
Although previous secure regenerating codes are uncondi-
tionally secure against eavesdropping, the confidentiality
caused large overhead. Since it is impossible to decrease
the overhead as keeping information-theoretic security, we
introduced the new definition of secure regenerating codes
using the concept of the indistinguishability.
We have proposed secure regenerating codes satisfy-
ing the new definition. The proposed secure regenerating
code consists of a new all-or-nothing transform and the non-
secure linear regenerating code. The overhead is negligibly
small as the message size is suﬃciently large. In fact, the
overhead of the proposed codes is less than that of previous
secure regenerating codes.
Showing the counter example, we explained that the
previous definition of the all-or-nothing transform is insuf-
ficient for achieving secure regenerating codes that satisfy
the new definition. We have relaxed the definition of an all-
or-nothing transform and have shown the new all-or-nothing
transform satisfying the relaxed definition.
The security analysis of the proposed codes is based on
the ideal cipher model. When the proposed code is imple-
mented, the ideal cipher has to be instantiated by a practical
cipher such as AES because the ideal cipher is a mathemati-
cal abstraction used in cryptographic proofs. Hence, our se-
curity analysis can be regarded as the security analysis when
an adversary considers the practical cipher as a black box.
As is well known, regenerating codes on which this pa-
per focuses are a concept born of network coding. Network
coding which is information-theoretically secure against
eavesdropping (called secure network coding) has been
studied (e.g., [15]–[18]). Using the idea of this paper, we
can probably construct eﬃcient secure network coding from
any network coding, but we leave this as a future work.
We also leave the implementation of our secure regenerat-
ing code.
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